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NORTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW
duction in one year would result in distorting taxable income has been
applied to prepayment of rentals,'0 bonuses for the acquisition of leases,
17
bonuses for the cancellation of leases,' 8 and commissions for negotiating
leases.19 On the other hand, it has been held that prepaid interest is
deductible in the year paid by a cash basis taxpayer.20
It is unfortunate that the courts have reached numerous conflicting
decisions on matters that should be kept uniform, simple, and clear.
It is submitted that there should be no difference in the tax treatment
of a three year prepayment of fire insurance premium, interest, or rent.
RICHARD J. TUGGrAr
Taxation-Stock Purchase Agreements-Life Insurance
Premiums as Constructive Dividends
The Internal Revenue Code of 1939 defined the term "dividend" as
"any distribution made by a corporation to its shareholders, whether in
money or in other property, (1) out of its earnings and profits ac-
cumulated after February 28, 1913, or (2) out of the earnings or profits
of the taxable year .... . 1  With a slight change, this definition has been
repeated in the Internal Revenue Code of 1954.2
In Sanders v. Fox3 it was held that premiums paid by a closely held
corporation for life insurance policies on the lives of the stockholders
were taxable as dividends to the stockholders in proportion to their hold-
ings.4  The policies had been taken out pursuant to an agreement be-
tween the corporation and stockholders providing that the corporation
would insure each stockholder and that the proceeds would be used to
buy the shares of a deceased stockholder.8 The agreement recited that
the insured would designate the beneficiary, but that the corporation
would be considered the owner of the policies during the lifetime of the
16 Baton Coal Co. v. Commissioner, 51 F.2d 469 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 284
U.S. 674 (1931).
Home Trust Co. v. Commissioner, 65 F.2d 532 (8th Cir. 1933).
Steele-Wedeles Co., 30 B.T.A. 841 (1934); Harriet B. Borland, 27 B.T.A.
538 (1933).
1 Bonwit Teller & Co. v. Commissioner, 53 F.2d 381 (2d Cir. 1931), cert.
denied, 284 U.S. 690 (1932).
2" John D. Fackler, 39 B.T.A. 395 (1939) (three year payment) ; Court Holding
Co., 2 T.C. 531 (1943), rezld on other grounds, 143 F.2d 823 (5th Cir. 1944),
rev'd without discussion. of this point, 324 U.S. 331 (1945) ; Joseph H. Konigsberg,
P-H 1946 T.C. Mem. Dec. ff 46024 (five year payment).
IInt. Rev. Code of 1939, § 115(a), 53 STAT. 46 (now INT. REV. CODE OF 1954,§ 316).
2 Ibid.
2149 F. Supp. 942 (D. Utah 1957).
' "The Corporation did not claim the premiums as a deduction for income tax
purposes, but accounted for these premiums as an asset on its balance sheet." Id.
at 945.
'The consideration given by the stockholder was his promise not to sell his
stock except as specified in the agreement.
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insured. On the death of the insured the beneficiary named by him
"would receive the insurance proceeds on the condition that the bene-
ficiary would sell the stock of the decedent to the corporation at an
adjusted price determined by the stockholders," plus a pro-rata share of
the cash surrender value of all the policies, or the amount of the pro-
ceeds of the policy, whichever was greater.6
In holding against the taxpayer, the court stressed that the parties
who really benefited from the life insurance were the stockholders,7 and
that while no dividends were declared, the payment of the premiums by
the corporation amounted to a constructive dividend.8 That the court
was willing, if necessary, to look through the corporate entity was
indicated by its quoting at length from the Tax Court decision of
Oreste Casale9 and paraphrasing language in that case with the state-
ment that, "For all practical purposes it might be stated the four stock-
holders were the corporation . ...- "
The Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit, in reversing the Tax
Court decision of the Casale case,11 applied reasoning which presents
an interesting contrast to that adopted in Sanders v. Fox.
Casale, who owned ninety-eight percent of the stock of 0. Casale,
Inc., and who was also president and chairman of the board, entered into
a deferred compensation agreement with the corporation which provided
that on his reaching age sixty-five, the corporation would pay him a
monthly income, and if he died prior thereto, would pay a certain sum
to his nominees.' 2 The corporation then purchased a $50,000 retire-
ment income policy on the life of Casale, paid all premiums, and was the
owner and beneficiary of the policy.' 3 At maturity or on the death of
Casale, all proceeds of the policy were to be paid to the corporation.
0Saiders v. Fox, 149 F. Supp. 942, 945 (D. Utah 1957). It is important to
note here that while the agreement gave the insured the right to designate the
beneficiary, the fact that the beneficiary would receive the insurance proceeds only
on condition that he sell to the corporation indicates that the corporation retained
additional rights in the proceeds not discussed by the court.
'The stockholder (actually his beneficiary) was given a guaranteed market for
stock that might otherwise be difficult to sell, and should he survive and the
decedent's stock be retained by the corporation, his proportionate share of
ownership of the corporation would be increased.
' The cases cited by the court in support of the application of the doctrine of
constructive dividends are discussed in note 22, infra.
°26 T.C. 1020 (1956), rezd, 247 F.2d 440 (2d Cir. 1957).
'o 149 F. Supp. at 946.
Casale v. Commissioner, 247 F.2d 440 (2d Cir. 1957).
"As consideration, Casale promised he would not start a competing business,
or work for a competitor of the corporation. For a discussion of similar plans see
Lasser and Rothschild. Deferred Compensation for Executives, 33 HARv. Bus. REV.
89 (1955) ; McCarthy, A Survey of Types of Supplementary Compensation for
Executives, 30 TAXEs 878 (1952).
" As in the principal case, the corporation did not attempt to deduct the
premium payments. 5 CCH 1954 STAND. FED. TAX RE'. 1 8684 states, "Until
a short while ago, a consistent pattern of tax treatment was applied. The premiums
were not deductible because the corporation was directly or indirectly the bene-
ficiary, and the proceeds were not taxable when received by the beneficiary."
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The Commissioner, as in the Sanders case, sought to tax the insurance
premiums as dividends to the stockholders, asserting that, "For all
practical purposes he was the corporation."'1 4 In refusing to adopt this
view, the court pointed out that should the corporation go bankrupt, the
policy would be subject to creditors' claims as would any other corporate
asset, and that while Casale completely dominated the corporation, he
had no legal interest in the policies.' 5
I In addition to the fact that the courts in the above cases differed
considerably in their willingness to look through the corporate entity,'
it is interesting to note that each court seemed to apply a different test
in reaching its conclusion. In the Sanders case the court emphasized
the fact that the real benefit of the insurance policies was to the stock-
holders and not to the corporation."1 In Casale, while acknowledging
that the stockholder derived a benefit from the insurance, the court
stressed the fact that the stockholder had no "legal interest" in the
policy.' 8
In the Sanders case, the stock purchase agreement recited that the
insurance policies and the values therein were to be considered as a
reserve to enable the corporation to acquire the shares of any deceased
stockholder. 19 This statement, coupled with the fact that the corpora-
'ion was named the owner of the policy during the insured's life, would
indicate that the policies remained assets of the corporation. Therefore,
rather than having the effect of a dividend, the purchase of the life
insurance policy was really an appropriation of earned surplus for a
' 247 F.2d at 443.
". The court also mentioned that the corporation was not bound to use the
insurance proceeds to meet its obligations under the deferred compensation contract,
but could use any available surplus.
'. 1 It is settled law that where the corporation is a sham (created solely for
purposes of tax avoidance) the corporate entity will be disregarded. See Higgins
v. Smith, 308 U.S. 473 (1939) ; Gregory v. Helvering, 293 U.S. 465 (1935).
: - The "benefit test" was also applied in Paramount-Richards Theatres Co. v.
Commissioner, 153 F.2d 602 (5th Cir. 1946). There, the corporation paid for the
life insurance on a stockholder, who was both owner and beneficiary of the policy.
In Prunier v. Commissioner, 248 F.2d 818 (1st Cir. 1957),' the court, in holding
that life insurance premiums were not taxable as dividends, stated that the real
benefit was to the corporation, not the stockholders. During the tax year in
question the stockholders were the named beneficiaries, but the insurance proceeds
were subject to a stock retirement agreement that was enforceable in equity. The
court emphasized the over-all tax scheme of treating the corporation as a separate
entity.
8 The court dealt rather summarily with Paramount-Richards Theatres Co.
v. Commissioner, supra note 17, by stating that there, the policies were owned by
the stockholder and could not have been reached by corporate creditors. Emeloid
Co. v. Commissioner, 189 F.2d 230 (3d Cir. 1951), applied the "business reason"
test. The court held that purchase of the stockholders' shares to promote harmony
among management was a proper business purpose. In that case, the policies
were initially purchased as key-man insurance and later assigned under a stock
purchase agreement. The court held that loans obtained by the corporation to
purchase the policies constituted borrowed, invested capital within the meaning
of the excess profits tax, and credit was allowed.1 149 F. Supp. at 944.
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specified purpose, namely, to meet the corporate obligations under the
stock purchase agreement.20  The court cited numerous cases in sup-
port of its holding that the premiums amounted to constructive divi-
dends, 21 but in each of those cases the funds in question had either been
removed from the corporate till, or could have been removed at any
time the stockholder chose to exercise a right of withdrawal.22  In each
case the result had been a reduction of earned surplus, which normally
occurs upon payment of a dividend.
23
Little objection may be found to the Commissioner's position where
the corporation pays the insurance premiums on a stockholder's life, and
the policy is completely owned and controlled by the stockholder.
24
20 "Earned surplus is sometimes appropriated-earmarked-by action of the
board of directors, for a particular purpose, in which case it is known as appropri-
ated surplus." McF.a1.AXD AND AYERs, ACCOUNTING FUNDAMENTALS 384 (2d ed.
1947).
"1 149 F. Supp. at 948. The term "constructive dividend" should not be
confused with "constructive receipt." See Hedrick v. Commissioner, 154 F.2d 90
(2d Cir. 1946); Note, Constructive Receipts: When Must the Taxpayer Pay?,
45 Irz- L. REV. 77 (1950).
22 Regensberg v. Commissioner, 144 F.2d 41 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 323 U.S.
783 (1944) (Stockholders obtained interest-free "loans" from the corporation.
Corporation made no attempt to collect "loans" until Commissioner investigated.
Held, loans were taxable as dividends even though no formal declaration.) ; Fitch
v. Helvering, 70 F.2d 583 (8th Cir. 1934) (Stockholder indebted to corporation.
Directors cancelled debt by declaring a gift to stockholder. Gift credited against
accumulated surplus. Held, taxable as income to stockholder.); Christopher v.
Burnet, 55 F.2d 527 (D.C. Cir. 1931) (Controlling stockholder withdrew funds
from corporation at no interest. Funds never repaid or any evidence of indebtedness
executed. Held, withdrawals taxable as dividends though no formal declaration.) ;
Phelps v. Commissioner, 54 F.2d 289 (7th Cir. 1931), cert. denied, 285 U.S. 558
(1932) (Corporation purchased 7200 of 7500 outstanding shares. After purchase, the
only property owned by the corporation was real estate. Held, gain was taxable as a
liquidating dividend rather than a gain resulting from a sale.) ; Chattanooga Say.
Bank v. Brewer, 17 F.2d 79 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 274 U.S. 751 (1927) (In
1920, stockholders withdrew funds from corporation through a drawing account in
proportion to their holdings. Corporation declared a dividend in 1921 which was
credited against drawing accounts. Held, amounts withdrawn were taxable as a
dividend in 1920.). For a general discussion of this problem see Werner, Stock-
holders' Withdrawals-Loans or Dividends?, 10 TAx L. REv. 569 (1955).
Cases not cited by the court, but dealing with the question of constructive divi-
dends: Weise v. Commissioner., 93 F.2d 921 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 304 U.S. 562
(1938) (Over a period of years stockholder "borrowed" a total of $103,000 from
the corporation, free from interest and for which no evidences of debt were given.
In 1932, the corporation wiped out the debt and reduced surplus by $103,000. Held,
stockholder received a $103,000 dividend in 1932.); Hadley v. Commissioner, 36
F.2d 543 (D.C. Cir. 1929) (Earnings credited to an account for each stockholder,
roughly in proportion to their holdings with each shareholder having unrestricted
right to withdraw from his account. Held, taxable as dividends.).
The court also cited Estate of Weil, 22 T.C. 1267 (1954) ; Estate of Salt, 17
T.C. 92 (1951) ; Third Nat'l Bank v. United States, 64 F. Supp- 198 (M.D. Tenn.
1946) ; and Lomb v. Sugden, 82 F.2d 166 (2d Cir. 1936), all holding that where an
estate is obligated to sell the stock or interest of the deceased at a certain price,
that price is the proper valuation to be placed on the stock or interest, for estate tax
purposes.
2" "It is a sound principle of accounting that dividends are payable out of
earned surplus." McFARLAND AND AYERs, op. cit. supra note 20, at 390.
" Paramount-Richards Theatres Co. v. Commissioner, 153 F2d 602 (5th Cir.
1946). That such a result will not always be reached is indicated- by Lewis v.
O'Malley, 140 F.2d 735 (8th Cir. 1944).
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There still may be no objection to a finding that an outlay results in a
dividend though not formally declared as such.2 5 However, it is difficult
to support the view that the stockholder has received a dividend when the
asset he supposedly received is still owned by the corporation, and re-
mains subject to creditors' claims and the hazards of business.26
Perhaps inclusion of the following provisions in a life insurance
funded stock purchase agreement would permit the taxpayer to avoid
the result of the Sanders case. First, state that the corporation is not
bound to the use of any specific funds with which to purchase the shares
of a deceased stockholder.2 T Second, state clearly that the corporation
is the beneficiary and sole owner of the policies, and that all proceeds
are payable only to the corporation. Third, provide that the stockholder
has no legal interest in the policies, and that all rights exercisable under
the policy (loan, cash surrender, change of beneficiary, etc.) are exercis-
able solely by the corporation. Fourth, emphasize that the agreement
is for the benefit of the corporation and not the stockholders. 28
Should the Commissioner be more successful in the future in having
corporation-paid life insurance premiums declared taxable as dividends
to the insured stockholders, it is likely that closely held corporations will
stop financing stock purchase agreements with life insurance. Rather
than purchase life insurance, the corporation will retain surplus with
which to meet its obligations under the stock purchase agreement.20
It is the writer's feeling that the parties who will probably be hurt most
by decisions such as that of Sanders v. Fox will be shareholders of cor-
" Regensberg v. Commissioner, 144 F.2d 41 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 323 U.S.
783 (1944); Christopher v. Burnet, 55 F.2d 527 (D.C. Cir. 1931); Hadley v.
Commissioner, 36 F.2d 543 (D.C. Cir. 1929); Werner, Stockholders' Withdrawals
-- Loans or Dividends?, 10 TAx L. REv. 569 (1955).
26 If a stockholder leaves the earned surplus within the corporation, makes a
legacy of his stock with a collateral agreement that the legatees sell the stock to the
corporation, not only is the ordinary income tax avoided, but the legatees who,
under INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, § 1014, acquire the stock at a new basis (value at
decedents death), are able to avoid capital gains tax. However, there is the
possibility that the government might then allege that the accumulations of surplus
were excessive and subject to the accumulated earnings tax imposed by INT. REv.
CODE OF 1954, § 531.
27 This can be accomplished by including a clause stating that any available
surplus may be used to meet the corporation's obligations under the agreement.
If the agreement recites that the insurance proceeds must be used, the Commissioner
has grounds for asserting that the stockholder has a legal interest in that particular
asset.
2 The benefits to the corporation may be considered largely illusory, but such
things as continuity of management and corporate policies, harmony among
management, and the fact that the policies are sound investments with good loan
values have been accepted by the courts. See Emeloid Co. v. Commissioner, 189
F.2d 230 (3d Cir. 1951) ; Lewis v. O'Malley, 140 F.2d 735 (8th Cir. 1944).
9 The corporation could become a "self-insurer" for this particular obligation.
See Lewis v. O'Malley, supra note 28, for a holding that investment of corporate
funds to meet the corporate obligations under a stock purchase agreement was a
proper business purpose. It would not be advisable to appropriate the earned sur-
plus to a specific fund since then the Commissioner might asert that the stockholders
have vested rights in the fund.
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porations that cannot afford to finance stock purchase agreements in-
ternally and the life insurance companies who will lose many potential
buyers of business life insurance.
ROBERT M. HUTTAR
Torts-Privacy-Bad Debt Letters to Employer
In a Georgia case, Gouldmnan-Taber Pontiac, Inc. v. Zerbst,1 the
defendant had written the plaintiff's employer a letter in which the
plaintiff's debt was described and the employer's aid in collecting the
debt was solicited. The employer confronted the plaintiff with the
letter, asked her to explain her failure to pay, and informed her that
the letter would be kept in the permanent file on her until the defendant
sent another letter stating the debt had been paid. An action was
brought by the plaintiff for damages for invasion of her privacy, which
invasion was alleged to have caused her great mental pain and distress.
Held, an employee has a right of privacy as against his employer in the
matter of the debts he owes, and a creditor who gives such information
to the employer is liable to the employee for an invasion of his privacy.
2
Judge Townsend concurring specially in denying a motion for rehearing
stated, "The spirit and intent of Georgia law on the subject of the right
to sue in tort for an invasion of the right of privacy is sufficiently broad
to cover a case such as is made here. I do not think this rule of law
should be given lip service only. Coercive action which tends to limit the
free choice of an individual in resisting what he feels to be an unjust
claim for money upon him is reprehensible, and there have been many
times in this state where employment was so scarce that to threaten an
-employee with discharge was equivalent to threatening him with starva-
tion."3
A tort action for the invasion of the right of privacy has been
recognized in twenty states, Alaska, and the District of Columbia.
4 It
has been limited by statute in two other states5 and has been declared
199 S.E.2d 475 (Ga. 1957).
'The court referred to McDaniel v. Atlanta Coca Cola Bottling Co., 60 Ga.
App. 92, 2 S.E.2d 810 (1939), wherein it was held that publication or commerciali-
zation of the information by the defendant is not necessary in order for the
plaintiff to recover for an invasion of privacy. The court also adverted to Quina v.
Roberts. 16 So. 2d 558 (La. App. 1944), wherein the defendant's letter to the
-plaintiff's employer requesting aid in collecting a debt of $1.45 was held to warrant
a recovery by the plaintiff of $100. (The Gouldinan-Taber Pontiac and theQuina cases are the two most extreme holdings protecting a debtor from an
invasion of his privacy by a creditor.) That the plaintiff claimed the alleged debt
was not owed and that the defendant had not brought suit nor gotten judgment
.gainst her was emphasized by the court in the principal case.
99 S.E.2d at 479.
'Annots., 138 A.L.R. 25 (1942), 168 A.L.R. 448 (1947), 14 A.L.R.2d 753
(1950), A.L.R. Supp. Service 771 (1957).
UTAH CoE ANN. §§ 76-4-8, 9 (1953), Donahue v. Warner Bros. Picture's
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